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improvement of currently available photo interpretation
systems.
The examples presented in this paper have, necessarily,
been concerned primarily with forest resource photo interpretation. Let it be said, however, that workers in
other area specialties are finding the potential uses of
photo interpretation to be no less promising and intriguing. It will be a great pity, indeed, if we should continue to overlook the additional rewards inherent in its
further development.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE

Favorite Sons: Obsolete Presidential Candidates
JAMES W. DAVIS
St. Cloud State College, St. Cloud
With the 1964 national nominating conventions slightly
more than a year away, nationwide political attention
will once again be focused upon the presidential sweepstakes race. Inasmuch as the party controlling the presidency, the "in-party," almost never discards an incumbent, the president is virtually assured renomination by
the Democrats; consequently politicians in both parties
and the American voters will be concerned chiefly with
the selection of the Republican candidate.
At this juncture it is impossible, of course, to predict
flatly how many of the leading Republican contenders
will openly toss their hats in the ring. But it is safe to
assert now that no matter which candidate formally enters the race early next year, Republican organizations
in several states, operating under a time-honored custom,
will once again choose favorite son candidates to head
their convention delegation. Unlike yesteryear, however,
when favorite son candidates were frequently chosen as
presidential candidates - and successfully elected - the
favorite sons of 1964 and future presidential election
years will not achieve the nomination prize. Why?
It will be the purpose of this paper to show that the
changing forces in the presidential nominating process especially the growing influence of the presidential primaries since World War II - have for all practical purposes ruled out the possibility of a favorite son ever again
winning the party nomination at the national convention.
I
The declining influence of favorite son candidates has
not sufficiently attracted the attention of political observ156

ers, although the trend has been observable for more
than a generation. The last time a Republican national
convention selected a favorite son candidate for president
and elected him was in 1920 when Senator Warren G.
Harding of Ohio became the convention choice on the
tenth ballot after the three leading contenders, Major
General Leonard Wood, Illinois Governor Frank 0.
Lowden, and Senator Hiram Johnson of California, became hopelessly deadlocked. The Democratic party has
not selected a favorite son presidential candidate since
John W. Davis of West Virginia was chosen in 1924 on
the 103rd ballot, following a ten-day balloting stalemate
between New York's Governor Alfred E. Smith and Senator William Gibbs McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury
in President Wilson's cabinet and son-in-law of the
former president.
Before proceeding further, let us clarify the term
"favorite son." In political parlance a favorite son is a
home-state presidential aspirant who may or may not be
a serious contender for the nomination. The types of favorite sons and the roles that they may perform can be
classified generally into five categories: 1
1. Outstanding favorite sons, who usually come from
' Material in this section is based, in considerable part, upon
the discussion of favorite sons found in Paul T. David, Malcolm
Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman (ed.), Presidential Nominating
Politics in 1952 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1954), I.
186-188. Additional information on favorite son candidates may
be obtained in Clarence A. Berdahl, "Presidential Selection and
Democratic Government," Journal of Politics, XI (February
1949), 35-40.
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large pivotal states, are serious contenders when the field
is wide open; their political influence and contacts extend
considerably beyond their state borders.
2. Rising favorite sons are usually governors or prominent members of Congress who have gained prominence
in their state. They are interested in spreading their
names beyond their state border and usually are more
concerned with future presidential elections, since they
cannot be expected to compete on even terms with nationally-known candidates or outstanding favorite sons.
3. Token favorite sons, usually the state party leader,
assume this role to demonstrate their control over the
state party organization or to forestall rival faction encroachments upon their control of the party. They may
wish to swing delegate support behind a particular candidate later.
4. Stand-in favorite sons, usually hand-picked by the
state organizations, are selected to reflect the wishes of
the party and are on the ticket because the presidential
primary laws of such states, for example, Ohio, require
that a candidate be listed.
5. Nuisance favorite sons are marginal candidates,
sometimes lacking solid organizational support even in
their own state. They have no chance of winning the
nomination but crave the publicity that attends their
entry in the presidential race. Occasionally these candidates cast themselves in the role of "spoilers," that is,
they try to prevent front-running candidates from obtaining a clear victory in a primary contest.
Examining these categories in more detail, the outstanding favorite sons usually enter one or more presidential primaries outside of their state as part of their
quest for the nomination. While the outstanding favorite
sons are not front-runners, they are well up in the pack,
within striking distance of the nomination in the event a
convention deadlock develops between two front-running
candidates. For example, Governor Earl Warren, California's outstanding favorite son in 1952 (and now Chief
Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court), would have been in
an excellent position for the nomination if a deadlock
had occurred between General Dwight D. Eisenhower
and Senator Robert A. Taft. In 1948 Senator Arthur
Vandenberg, Michigan's outstanding favorite son, who
declined to campaign actively for the nomination, was
considered by a number of observers to have been the
logical compromise if Governor Thomas E. Dewey and
Senator Taft had become stalemated.
Since the outstanding favorite son almost invariably
comes from a large pivotal state, he has a block of delegates to serve as the nucleus for a home-stretch drive.
The outstanding favorite son usually has been acquainted
with other important state leaders who in the past have
been willing under certain circumstances to assist his
candidacy rather than see the convention bogged down
in a deadlock. The chief handicap of most outstanding
sons, however, has been their lack of nationwide organization to compete on even terms with a nationally-known
candidate.
Rising favorite sons are usually privy to the inner
Proceedings, Volume Thirty-one, No. 2, 1964

councils of the party professionals, but lacking full stature, comprise the second team of presidential candidates.
Front-runing candidates treat them with respect and, in
turn, expect the rising favorite son to step aside when
the smaller islands of delegates began breaking up and
gravitating toward the nationally-known candidates. This
works no great hardship on the rising favorite son. He
has had the opportunity to bask in the limelight of the
convention, be wooed by the national candidate's political managers, or be promised certain political favors in
the event of the nationally-known candidate's successful
election. He may even be considered as a "long-shot"
vice presidential candidate. The rising favorite son is
given an opportunity to test his political wings; the party
professionals may mark him down in their books as a
future national contender. Or, more likely, the rising
favorite son may never reach those dreamed-of heights
and be forever consigned to the second team or destined
to political oblivion. Democratic Governor of New Jersey, Robert B. Meyner, in 1956 would belong to this
category.
Token favorite sons are usually veteran party leaders
who wish to be in a position to exert powerful influence
in the choice of the party nominee. The token favorite
son maintains tight control over his delegation so that he
will be in a position to swing behind the candidate he
considers best-qualified as the party's vote-getter in November. If he wishes, he may serve as a stalking horse
for a leading presidential contender who needs to have
his support of the delegation at a vital point in the balloting. The token candidate is almost never in the thick
of presidential contention. For a variety of reasons, he
is not politically "available" - he may come from a
"safe" Republican or Democratic state, be too told, tarnished with the boss label, too closely identified with a
large pressure group, or unacceptable to important minority groups. Governor George Docking of Kansas in
1960 would undoubtedly belong in this category.
Stand-in favorite sons are largely products of certain
presidential primary laws and are never serious contenders for the nomination. Stand-in candidates are entered
to comply with filing requirements which include the consent of presidential candidates to enter. Delegates in these
states are usually formally pledged to a presidential candidate. In some instances stand-in favorite sons are also
used by incumbent presidents who, either for reasons of
health or political expediency, do not wish to announce
their intentions. In the case of President Truman in
1952, a stand-in favorite son was used in the Minnesota
primary (Senator Hubert H. Humphrey) until the President finally made up his mind not to seek re-election.
When President Truman asked that his name be withdrawn from the California presidential primary, Attorney
General Edmund G. "Pat" Brown - now Governor
Brown - was pressured by the state organization to serve
as the Democratic stand-in candidate to keep Senator
Estes Kefauver from winning the primary by default.
Governor Brown, who has since turned back the challenge of former Vice President Richard M. Nixon and
been re-elected governor of the largest state in the Union,
157

can of course no longer be considered merely a stand-in
candidate. If next year were 1968, Governor Brown
would be, at the very least, an outstanding favorite son
and conceivably a leading contender for the nomination.
Nuisance favorite son candidates, the fifth and final
category, are usually unknown to most American voters.
Who, for example, could identify Riley Bender, favorite
son candidate for president in the 1944 Illinois Republican primary and preference winner in the 1948 Republican primary? Driven more by pure egotism and the desire for publicity than a willingness or ability to organize
a full-fledged campaign, the nuisance candidates rarely
cause sleepless nights for front-running candidates. Although the nuisance candidates are often the first to
admit that they have no possibility of winning the nomination, they sometimes delight in assuming the "spoiler"
role. For example, Democratic Senator Wayne B. Morse
of Oregon waged a "stop-Kennedy" crusade throughout
the 1960 presidential primary campaign. He singled out
the Massachusetts senator for his "reactionary" voting
record, especially his vote supporting the Landrum-Griffin labor reform law. Yet, Morse was the first to concede
that his chances for the nomination were hopeless. Undoubtedly as long as there are presidential primary laws,
there will be nuisance favorite son candidates, but they
will never be considered as having any more possibility
of becoming president than the average voter does.

II
The emergence of the favorite son candidate antedates
the rise of the progressive-inspired presidential primary
movement, the first significant change in the presidential
nominating process since the founding of the national
party conventions in the 1830's. But it has been the presidential primary system itself that has modified and,
more recently, changed the role of the favorite son. The
original and avowed purpose of the presidential primary
system was to take the power of nominating presidential
candidates out of the hands of the party leaders and
bosses and put it into the hands of the rank and file
voters. Yet, despite the determination of the progressives
to reduce boss control of presidential nominations
through the use of the presidential primary, party leaders
in a number of primary states were able to outmaneuver
the reformers by watering down the provisions of the
primary laws. 2 Through use of candidate consent statements and by eliminating the delegate's formal pledges
of support to a presidential candidate, the party leaders
emasculated the primary laws in a number of states. The
net effect of these revisions was to discourage many presidential aspirants from entering these primaries. Instead
of providing the voters with an opportunity to choose
between leading presidential contenders, the amended
primary laws spawned a new host of favorite son candidates. This development has persisted in some states to
the present time. In Ohio, for example, the list of standin favorite sons in the Democratic party for the period
1940-1956 included: former Lieutenant Governor
2
Louise Overacker, The Presidential Primary (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1926), pp. 17-22.
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Charles Sawyer ( 1940); State Auditor Joseph T. Ferguson ( 1944); Treasurer of the United States William A.
Julian ( 1948) ; former U. S. Senator Robert J. Bulkley
( 1952); and Governor (now Senator) Frank Lausche
( 1956). Indeed, Professor Berdahl tells us that the favorite son technique has been developed into such an art
in Ohio that the decision to enter a favorite son slate has
even been made before any specific person has been
agreed upon to head the delegation. 3
By endorsing a favorite son in the primary the state
party organizations have frequently been able to frighten
away a front-running candidate from entering the presidential primary. The purpose of this action, of course, is
to cut down the front-runner to size, with the view of
enhancing the state party organization's bargaining in the
event of a convention deadlock, and perhaps even nominating the home state favorite son or a compromise candidate. Also, the state organization may desire to extract
certain concessions from the front-runner before switching support to him. In some instances the state party organization may choose and support a favorite son in
order to avoid a divisive conflict between rival local supporters of leading presidential candidates. Under other
circumstances the state party leaders may be undecided
on which candidate they wish to support. By putting up
a favorite son candidate, the organization can establish a
holding operation until convention time. Meanwhile, the
party leaders can observe the results of other presidential
primary contests and state conventions and watch the
public opinion polls in unhurried fashion.
Since the beginning of the presidential primary era,
the prevailing view of presidential candidates and political commentators alike has been that it is a dangerous
practice to challenge the favorite son candidates. According to these sources, the price in terms of favorite and
state organizational opposition to the invading challenger
- and possibly apprehension that the state organization
may attempt to "throw" the general election to the rival
party should the challenger win the nomination - is more
than most presidential aspirants are willing to pay.

III
The favorite son strategy of state party organizations
confronts the leading presidential candidates with a
dilemma of the first order. Shall the nationally-known
challenger risk a shattering defeat at the hands of the
state party organization by permitting the state organization to frighten him away with the threat of a fight in the
primary and, in effect, swindle him out of possible delegate support in the state? Or shall the nationally-known
candidate roll up his sleeves and prepare to fight the state
organization in the primary? That seasoned presidential
campaigners recognize the inherent danger of challenging
favorite sons may be deduced from the scant number of
presidential contenders, only six, who have been willing
to gamble their nomination chances on this strategy. Not
only do most presidential candidates wish to avoid alienating the favorite son and his state organization ( and
thus risk losing possible second choice support at the
3

Berdahl, op. cit., p. 36.
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national convention when the favorite son drops out of
the race), but there is also the haunting fear that the
gamble will fail and the invading presidential candidate
will suffer a needless - and possibly disastrous - defeat
that could have been avoided merely by staying out of
the fray.
The first presidential candidate to get his nose bloodied in a favorite son primary battle was Major General
Leonard E. Wood in the historic 1920 Republican nominating race. Despite the advice of experienced politicians, General Wood and his managers decided to invade Illinois and challenge Governor Frank 0. Lowden,
the favorite son. Wood campaigned vigorously up and
down the state. Governor Lowden, on the other hand, refused to campaign openly on the grounds that if he could
not win his home state primary on his record as governor,
he should not be a candidate. 4 Despite the expenditure
of more than $300,000 by the Wood forces in the state,
Governor Lowden won handily, 236,802 votes to Wood's
156,719. This was lesson number one. Still undaunted,
General Wood and his political advisers decided to move
into Ohio and challenge the Buckeye State's favorite son,
Senator Warren G. Harding. Once again, the Wood
forces spent lavishly and enjoyed the backing of the late
Theodore Roosevelt's sizeable following in Ohio; yet
Harding won, 123,257 votes to 108,565. Even though
General Wood captured nine of Ohio's forty-eight delegates and succeeded in defeating Harding's campaign
manager, Harry M. Daughtery, in one of the delegate
contests, this was small consolation because Wood's tactics intensified the hostility of party regulars in Ohio and
elsewhere to his candidacy. 5
Wood was generally regarded as the front-runner
throughout the primary, but he had been unable to crack
the favorite son barrier. He led in the early convention
balloting with a high of 314½ votes (less than onethird of the convention vote) on the fourth ballot, but
lost the nomination on the tenth ballot to Harding, a
compromise choice of Republican organizational leaders.
Between 1928 and 1960 five presidential candidatesHerbert Hoover, William E. Borah, Harold E. Stassen,
and Estes Kefauver and John F. Kennedy-mustered
enough courage to tackle favorite son candidates on their
homeground. Yet only two of these candidates, Hoover
and Kennedy, received the nomination. But does this
necessarily mean that challenging a favorite son is always foolhardy or bad politics? The reasons for the failure of Borah, Stassen, and Kefauver to win the nomination were much more deep-seated and existed before
these men decided to flaunt the time-honored tradition
of avoiding direct challenges to favorite sons. All three
of these candidates were unacceptable to prominent factions in their party and lacked solid organizational support in a large number of states using party conventions
to elect delegates. Hoover and Kennedy, with much
'Wesley M. Bagby, The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential
Campaign and Elel'lion of 1920 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, I 962). p. 51.
0
Ibid.
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stronger personal organizations, adequate finances, and
a solid base of delegate strength in the convention states
were able to turn their challenges of favorite son candidates into positive assets. Each of these candidacies deserves brief mention .
Herbert Hoover, anxious to step beyond the shadows
of being merely a Cabinet member for President Coolidge and thwart the opposing stalwart Republican coalition leaders before they blocked his road to the nomination, did not hesitate to let his name be entered against
three favorite son candidates - Senators Frank Willis,
Ohio; James Watson, Indiana; and Guy D. Goff, West
Virginia. Although Hoover collected some battle scars
in these three bouts, he achieved part of his objective of
demonstrating his popular appeal in unfriendly territory
and flashing a warning to the uncommitted delegates to
jump onto his fast-moving bandwagon before it was too
late. In Ohio Hoover captured thirty-one delegates, including all seven delegates-at-large, out of the fifty-onemember Ohio delegation. This was done in spite of the
fact that the Willis machine controlled the Republican
organization in eighty out of eighty-eight counties. Hoover's margin of victory came from the large cities - he
carried Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Toledo by a three to
one vote. 0 Even though he lost the Indiana and West
Virginia primaries by narrow margins, Hoover's votegetting ability in the urban areas impressed a number of
eastern Republican strategists who had been fearful that
he would be no match for the popular New York Governor Alfred E. Smith in the big cities.
In 1936 cantankerous Republican Senator William E.
Borah, Idaho's stentorian voice in Washington, entered
the presidential race more to express his disapproval of
the organizational forces backing Kansas Governor Alfred M. Landon than with hope of winning the nomination. Borah, after primary victories in Wisconsin and a
narrow defeat against Colonel Frank Knox in Illinois,
challenged · the Ohio Republican, organization's slate,
headed by its favorite son, young Robert A. Taft, then
a state senator. But Borah collected only five delegates
out of the 52-member delegation. Borah's overwhelming
defeat in the New Jersey primary, which followed on the
heels of his Ohio defeat, was the final blow to his candidacy. The Idaho senator's advancing age - he was approaching his seventieth birthday - was also a factor in
the party's rejection of his candidacy.
Twelve years later, former Minnesota Governor Harold E. Stassen's spectacular bid for the presidential nomination also received a serious jolt in the Ohio primary
when he unsuccessfully challenged Ohio's same favorite
son, Robert A. Taft, now a United States Senator. Although Stassen had run up a string of primary victories
in Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania, he captured
only nine delegates out of the 53-member Ohio delegation in a straight delegate contest. Stassen's weak showing
in Ohio plus his defeat at the hands of New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey in the Oregon primary, the final
"trial heat" of the 1948 nominating campaign, destroyed
• 111dianapolis Star, April 26, 1928.
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any hope of his winning the nomination. In 1952 Stassen attempted again to get his candidacy off the ground
in Ohio by challenging Taft and his favorite son slate,
but this time he failed to win a single delegate! After
this defeat Stassen was no longer considered a serious
contender for the nomination.
In the 1952 Democratic pre-convention race Senator
Estes Kefauver, aided by a split in the Ohio Democratic organization, was able to win half of the fifty-two
pledged delegates in a race against the Ohio favorite
son, former Senator Robert J . Bulkley. Kefauver also
captured the pledged California delegation by defeating
stand-in-favorite son, Attorney General Edmund G.
"Pat" Brown. These two victories against the favorite
sons gave Kefauver's candidacy a powerful boost, but
not enough to overcome the combined opposition of the
northern city Democratic leaders and the conservative
Southern bloc. The main conclusion to be drawn from
Kefauver's 1952 pre-convention campaign is that successful challenges against favorite sons alone are not
enough to win the nomination. Four years later Kefauver made a second bid for the nomination, but this time
he found the doors closed to him in the favorite son
states. He stayed away from Ohio, where the rival factions had become reconciled. In California he faced Adlai
E. Stevenson, instead of a favorite son, and lost decisively. In the only clear-cut favorite son contest, New Jersey,
Kefauver won only one-half delegate vote to favorite son
Governor Robert B. Meyner's thirty-one and one-half
votes. The harsh fact that favorite son candidates can be
a mountainous barrier to the nomination was brought
home to Kefauver all too clearly in the 19 56 pre-convention campaign.
The most adroit job of handling favorite son candidates was done by President John F. Kennedy, then U.S.
Senator from Massachusetts, in the 1960 pre-convention
campaign. Well aware that only bold tactics would enable him to overcome the handicap of his youth, his Roman Catholic religion, and early lack of support from
the northern city Democratic leaders, Kennedy scored
one of his biggest pre-convention coups in Ohio against
the threatened favorite son candidacy of Governor Michael V. DiSalle. By late December, 1959, Governor DiSalle's lieutenants had lined up support in approximately
four-fifths of Ohio's eighty-eight counties. This show of
force was expected to keep Senator Kennedy out of the
Ohio presidential primary. But Kennedy, riding the crest
of a national publicity wave, with a solid bloc of New
England delegates, ample funds, and a well-organized
staff, decided to gamble on an Ohio invasion. He had
some strength in Ohio, and he needed an early, spectacular victory in a pivotal industrial state before embarking on the presidential primary trail. Kennedy also
had a secret weapon - a possible alliance with Ray T.
Miller, the dissident Democratic leader of Cuyahoga
County (Cleveland), who had been at odds with DiSalle.7 Fearful that a Kennedy-Miller team slate might
win over his favorite son ticket, or at least badly split
7

William H. Hessler, "How Kennedy Took Ohio," The Reporter, XXII (March 3, 1960), p. 21.

160

the delegation, and not desiring to give his rival Miller
an opening, DiSalle capitulated after quickly surveying
the state once more. All of this activity had been going
on behind the scenes. To the amazement of most nationwide political observers, DiSalle announced on January
5, 1960, "I will be a candidate for favorite son committed to the candidacy of Senator John F. Kennedy." 8 This
quick, silent victory enabled the Kennedy forces to
pocket the sixty-four-vote Ohio delegation, the fifth
iargest in the country, and freeze out the Symington,
Stevenson, Humphrey, and Johnson advance elements
before they had completed their pre-primary election
surveys. Kennedy's bold stroke also saved him an expensive, hard-fought campaign in the primary.
Senator Kennedy displayed the same rough-and-tumble
tactics in Maryland against Governor Millar Tawes, the
proposed favorite son. It had been Tawes' original plan
to head an "uninstructed" delegation. But the imminent
threat that the popular Massachusetts Senator might
come into Maryland to campaign against Tawes was
enough in late January, 1960, to dissuade the Maryland
governor from running. 0 Shortly thereafter Kennedy formally announced in Annapolis his entry in the Maryland
primary. Goveror Tawes continued to rebuff the Kennedy clan's blandishments for a formal endorsement until the final week of the primary campaign, although a
number of influential members of his administration had
been openly supporting Kennedy. The governor's belated
endorsement no doubt helped reduce the possibility of
the Maryland Democratic organization voting for an uncommitted delegation or one of Kennedy's rivals in the
primary. Senator Kennedy was opposed by Senator
Wayne B. Morse, the Oregon legislator who maintains
a stock farm in suburban Montgomery County, next to
Washington, D.C., and two perennial candidates, Andrew
J. Easter of Baltimore and Lar Daly, a Chicago manufacturer. All three of Kennedy's opponents were
swamped by the Kennedy deluge of votes, which totaled
over 70 % of the ballots cast.
Senator Kennedy also tangled with Senator Morse,
running as a favorite son, in the latter's home-state presidential primary. Kennedy's main campaign theme in
the Oregon primary was: "Don't waste a vote by voting
for a favorite son who cannot be nominated." 10 The Oregon voters apparently agreed, for Kennedy outpointed
Morse 146,332 votes to 91,715. Morse's defeat underscored a new basic principle of nominating politics: a
nationally-known presidential candidate is an almost certain winner in a primary in which his only active opposition is a favorite son with no serious chance of winning
the nomination. As one careful observer noted: "Senator
Morse was really asking the voters of Oregon to give him
authority at the convention to be used at the discretion
of the delegates who might thus play the role of kingmakers. The difficulty with the Morse position was that
the voters could themselves be kingmakers in the primary
8
lbid.
• New York Times , January 25, 1960.
,o New York Times, May 19, 1960.
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by voting for one of the major candidates."11 Senator
Morse, recognizing the futility of his position, withdrew
from the presidential race less than twenty-four hours
after the Oregon returns were in.
Like a good poker player, Senator Kennedy decided
not to push his luck too far in challenging favorite sons.
He avoided open fights in California, Florida, and New
Jersey. Before deciding not to enter the California primary, however, he engaged in some heavy psychological
warfare against Governor Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, California's favorite son. Governor Brown reportedly threatened Kennedy with the loss of California in the general
election if the Massachusetts senator entered the primary
against Brown. But Kennedy refused to knuckle under
to this threat. Twice in January, 1960, Senator Kennedy
announced he was still studying the possibility of entering the California primary. On March 1, as the filing
date (March 9) approached, he denied that he had made
up his mind not to run in California. Kennedy said that
no decision would be made for a week, but he indicated
that he would probably enter because he felt confident
that he could defeat Governor Brown. Suddenly, on
March 2, Senator Kennedy announced that he would
not enter the California primary. 12 Kennedy said "a desire for party unity in California" was his reason. However, it was rumored that his real reason for not entering was that he had worked out an agreement with Brown
whereby the California governor agreed to a policy of
presidential candidate neutrality before the convention
and also to include a substantial number of Kennedy
supporters in the California delegation. 13 (It may be
worth recalling that Senator Kennedy received thirtythree and one-half votes from the eighty-one-member
delegation on the first and only ballot at the convention.)
Senator Kennedy also decided to avoid a favorite son
contest against Governor Robert B. Meyner in New Jersey. With heavy second choice support among New Jersey Democrats, Kennedy felt that little was to be gained
by adding this primary fight to his campaign. The Massachusetts senator had reaped handsome dividends from
his forays in Ohio and Maryland; therefore, it was scarcely necessary to take on the additional burden of this primary. In Florida where Senator George Smathers, a personal friend of Kennedy's, was leading a favorite son delegation, Kennedy had protected his flanks by blocking
out several other contenders from this race. According
to one source, he agreed to stay out of Florida, but let
it be understood that he would enter the Sunshine State
primary if either Senators Lyndon B. Johnson or Stuart
Symington entered. 14
Howard Penniman, "Primary Teachers," America, CIII
(June 18, 1960), p. 369. Under Oregon law the national convention delegates are pledged to support the winner of the preference primary until such candidate receives less than 35 per
cent of the votes for nomination by the national convention, releases the delegates from their pledge, or until two nominating
ballots have been taken. Oregon Revised Statutes (1959), paragraph 249.210.
u New York Times, March 3, 1960.
3
' lbid.
"Paul T. David (ed.), The Presidential Election and Transi-

Judging from these recent examples, it would appear
that the nationally-known candidates, not the favorite
sons, are coming to dictate the strategy and course of
the nominating race.
IV
Abolition of the Democratic party's historic twothirds rule, that is, the requirement that the party nominee obtain two-thirds of the convention vote to be nominated also marked a turning point in the role performed
by Democratic favorite sons. Prior to 1936, it was the
standard practice of state party organizations to put up a
favorite son candidate, since the two-thirds rule made it
relatively easy to block the front-running candidate with
a host of favorite sons.
A review of the Democratic national convention before and after 1936 reflects rather clearly the influence
of the two-thirds rule upon the number of favorite sons
nominated at the national conclave. Table A below shows
a large number of favorite son candidates contesting in
the balloting between 1920 and 1936 and a perceptible
drop after that date in those presidential election years
when the Democrats have been the out-party or when an
"open" convention race has existed.
TABLE A: Democratic Favorite Son Candidates Polling 15
Votes or More at National Conventions (First Ballot Only)
When Democrats Have Been the Out-Party or When an "Open"
Convenion Race Has Existed.
(I 920- I 960)
Year

1920
1924
1928
1932
1952
1956
1960

No. of Favorite Son Candidates

11
10

10
6

5
5
3

Table B below shows a corresponding drop in the number of Republican favorite son candidates during the
same period, but for other reasons that apply both to Republican and Democratic candidates in the present era
of presidential primaries, mass communications, and public opinion polls.
The declining number of favorite son candidates reTABLE B: Republican Favorite Son Candidates Polling 15
Votes or More at National Conventions (First Ballot Only)
When Republicans Have Been the Out-Party or When an "Open"
Convention Race Has Existed.
( 1920-1960)
Year

No. of Favorite Son Candidates

1920
1936
1940
1944
1948
1952

7
*
6
*

11
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4

2

''' Only one candidate nominated at convention.
tion 1960-1961 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961 ),
pp. 8-9.
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fleets the gradual "nationalizing" of presidential politics
and the steady increase in the number of two-party states.
Favorite sons who represent state or sectional interests
no longer possess serious appeal to convention delegates.
The intense competition between Republicans and Democrats for the presidency in many of the pivotal twoparty states has caused the state party leaders to look
for presidential candidates who will appeal strongly to
the mass groups of laborers, suburbanites, and ethnic
minorities in the heavily urbanized states. The state party leaders and convention delegates alike have ceased for
the most part to be preoccupied with selecting favorite
sons to barter and bargain with at the convention. Instead, the leaders and their delegates are looking ahead
to winning the general election with a well-known presidential candidate who has demonstrated vote-getting ability in the primaries and who they believe can help carry
the state and local tickets in November. Favorite sons are
becoming the forgotten men in American politics. No
wonder California's prospective favorite son for the 1960
Democratic convention, Governor Edmund G . "Pat"
Brown lamented to a national columnist in 1959 : "Nobody outside of California has ever heard of Pat Brown
.. . And if nobody's ever heard of you, how the hell do
you become a serious presidential candidate?" Brown
added wistfully: "If only I could change places with Nelson Rockefeller!" 15
Speaking of the future role of the favorite son, Professor William G. Carleton has remarked: "The days of
the favorite son . . . are numbered, if indeed they are
not already finished. " 16 Insofar as winning the presidential nomination, the evidence of the presidential nominating conventions since 1936 convincingly supports this
judgment. This devolpment represents a complete turnabout of national convention patterns, for prior to the
Great Depression the nomination of favorite sons or
"dark horses" was a common practice. Since then, no
favorite son has come close to winning the nomination
against the popular, nationally-known candidates such as
Hoover, Roosevelt, Dewey, Eisenhower, Stevenson
( 1956), or Kennedy .
The mass media ignore the favorite son candidates.
Instead, the newspaper, television, radio, and news magazine media, which have assumed a vital publicity role in
the presidential nominating process of this vast country,
concentrate their coverage upon the presidential primary
contests of nationally-known candidates, who may b~ the
Vice President of the United States, an outstanding Senator, or a popular military hero. The press services build
up the nationally-known candidate and thus make him
even better known or identified to the average voter. Television and radio networks compete with each other to
carry into millions of homes the nationally-known contenders on their "meet the press" interview programs.
Because the nationally-known candidate commands read" "How Now, Brown?" Time, LXXIV (October 26, 1959),
p. 14.
0
'
William G. Carleton, "The Revolution in the Presidential
Nominating Convention," Political Science Quarterly, LXXII
(June, 1957), p. 224.
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er attention, the mass circulation magazines carry frequent political sketches and human interest stories, liberally sprinkled with smiling photographs of the candidate and his family."
Public opinion polls on the "trial heat" contests between the leading rivals for the presidential nomination
have also become important barometers for measuring
the candidates presidential stock. The leadership spot in
the polls may have a more important bearing on the convention outcome than the support of a favorite son delegation. Favorite son candidates are usually rated so low
in these polls that the average reader may see their names
for the first time in the poll results.
In the middle of the twentieth century favorite son
candidates are also becoming overshadowed, if they have
not already been dwarfed, by the recurring international
crises and national emergencies which have shifted attention away from the individual states. How many favorite sons, for example, have had an interview with Premier Khrushchev?
As a result of these changing developments in American politics, the only manner in which the favorite son
ca-n hope to compete under this system is to attempt to
break out of the favorite son shell and become a nationally-known personage in his own right, which of course
has the effect of removing him from the parochialism of
the favorite son category.
V
In summarizing, it seems fair to predict, first , that the
general trend of presidential nominating politics will be
against selecting favorite sons as party nominees. The
handwriting is on the wall: favorite sons will continue to
persist under the present nominating system, but their
chances of winning the presidential nomination will be
almost nil. Secondly, although challenging favorite sons
continues to entail heavy risk and may even stall or
wreck the presidential aspirations of the challenger, a
strong, nationally-known candidate, backed with good
organization, ample funds, and a beachhead of support
from a prominent faction in the state may be more than
a match for the favorite son. Herbert Hoover was the
first candidate to use this strong-arm form of campaigning with considerable success in 1928, although he did
not personally campaign in the favorite son states. Senator Estes Kefauver in I 952 used this campaign tactic
with some success but did not win the nomination because he was unable to overcome opposition from several
17
Edward L. Berneys, editor of a manual on public relations
techniques-Engineering of Consent-lists the following channels of communication existing in the United States today:
1,800 daily newspapers
10,000 weekly newspapers
7,600 magazines
2,000 trade journals
7,635 periodicals geared to ethnic groups
100,000,000 radio sets
12,000,000 television sets
15,000 motion-picture houses
6,000 house organs
Quoted by Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (New
York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 216-217.
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major power factions in the Democratic party before and
at the national convention. Convincing proof that challenging the favorite sons can help springboard a challenger to the nomination was still lacking until Senator
John F. Kennedy came along and used this campaign
device with astounding success in the 1960 pre-convention race.
Kennedy demonstrated that challenging favorite sons
or threatening to challenge them in the presidential primaries can serve several purposes: (a) frighten favorite
sons into supporting a nationally-known challenger without a primary fight; (b) win concessions for the challenger in the form of a sizeable delegation on a favorite
son's state delegation to the national convention; (c)
keep other prospective challengers away from a favorite son who may give strong second ballot support to the
nationally-known candidate; and, most important of all,
( d) demonstrate to the uncommitted state delegations
powerful vote-getting support under actual election campaign conditions; in other words, create a winning "image" that helps nail down the nomination.
As the front-running candidates become more audacious in challenging favorite sons, the presidential primary laws such as those of California and Ohio will take
on a new look and may again assume the importance that
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their original proponents intended. Genuine popularity
contests between leading contenders will become an established practice again in these states because the stringent filing requirements that the party legislative leaders
wrote into the laws to frighten away out-of-state challengers will no longer be a major roadblock to these challengers. The nationally-known candidates now have the
weapons - the presidential primaries, the mass news media, the public opinion polls - to attack the favorite son
citadels. Instead of the state party leaders using the presidential primary law and the favorite son gambit as a
barrier to keep the front-runners away, these front-runners can be expected to turn around and use the presidential primary popularity contest to beat down the favorite son threat.
One aspect of the presidential nominating pattern,
then, seems clear. Favorite son candidates are obsolete
in the fast-moving nationwide presidential nominating
politics of the post-World War II period. While it can
be expected that this type of candidate will continue to
be nominated in some states, the inescapable conclusion
of this paper is that favorite sons will seldom play a crucial role any longer in determining the outcome of presidential nominations.
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